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Abstract
Parts I and II discuss the regulation of advisers and brokers in the United States through first
a historical and then a functional prism. Part III illustrates these two approaches by looking at one
particular rule regulating investment advisers — the performance fee rule — which challenges the
assumptions I am making about the regulation of advisers and brokers. Part IV discusses recent
regulatory initiatives at the SEC in light of these two approaches.
II. LOOKING BEYOND NATIONAL BOUND-
ARIES
MODELS OF SECURITIES REGULATION IN
THE UNITED STATES
Arthur B. Laby*
INTRODUCTION
There are two general approaches to securities regulation in
the United States: the first is to require disclosure of informa-
tion about securities and about market participants; the second
is to prohibit particular types of conduct by those market partici-
pants. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission") regulates most public companies, for example,
by requiring disclosure of material information in annual and
quarterly reports and other disclosure documents.1 The SEC
does not pass judgment on whether a particular company would
make a good investment.2 The SEC regulates stockbrokers, on
the other hand, by placing many substantive prohibitions on
their activities.' Tender offers are regulated primarily through
* Special Counsel, Division of Investment Management, Securities and Exchange
Commission. Portions of this paper were presented at a Symposium entitled The Com-
petition Law of Deregulation, in Weimar, Germany, on October 17, 1998. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"), as a matter of policy, dis-
claims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commis-
sion. The author thanks Sharon Byrd, Marisa Lago, Richard Lai, Robert Plaze and Jen-
nifer Sawin for comments and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(a) (1997 & Supp.
1998) (requiring issuers to disclose "such information and documents.., as the Com-
mission shall require to keep reasonably current," annual, and quarterly reports as pre-
scribed by Commission).
2. Merit based regulation of public companies was debated and rejected in the
1930s in favor of disclosure. See James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities
Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29 (1959).
3. See Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 690
(1995) ("The 1934 Act contains a number of provisions, in the nature of substantive
regulation, that are designed to protect customers' funds and securities in the hands of
broker-dealers.").
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disclosure,4 while certain types of transactions with affiliates are
banned, even if the transactions are fully disclosed.5
These two approaches-disclosure and substantive prohibi-
tions-also can be demonstrated through the difference in the
regulation of two types of market professionals: investment ad-
visers (or "advisers"), who are regulated primarily through dis-
closure, and broker-dealers (or "brokers"), who are subject to
substantive prohibitions on their activities. This Essay shall focus
on the regulation of advisers and brokers as a sort of case study
to explore why we find ourselves with these different regimes.
Parts I and II discuss the regulation of advisers and brokers
in the United States through first a historical and then a func-
tional prism. Part III illustrates these two approaches by looking
at one particular rule regulating investment advisers-the per-
formance fee rule-which challenges the assumptions I am mak-
ing about the regulation of advisers and brokers. Part IV dis-
cusses recent regulatory initiatives at the SEC in light of these
two approaches.
I. INVESTMENT ADVISER AND
BROKER-DEALER REGULATION
Investment advisers in the United States are generally sub-
ject to broad duties of disclosure, not detailed substantive rules
prohibiting conduct. Under the Investment Advisers Act of
19406 ("Advisers Act"), advisory firms are required to make de-
tailed disclosures about their business, and the people who work
there to the SEC and to their clients. When a firm seeks to regis-
ter as an adviser with the SEC, the firm submits a SEC Form
ADV,7 which contains detailed questions about the firm's his-
tory, operations, services, and fees, as well as questions about the
firm's employees and affiliates, including their disciplinary his-
4. See e.g. Securities Exchange Act § 13(e), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(e) (1997 & Supp.
1998) and SEC Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4 (1999).
5. See, e.g., Investment Company Act §§ 17(a), 17(b), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-17(a),
80a-17(b) (1997 & Supp. 1998) (prohibiting certain transactions between investment
company and specified persons who are affiliated persons of investment company).
6. Investment Advisers Act § 203, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3 (1997 & Supp. 1998). Invest-
ment advisers register with the Commission on Form ADV, a uniform form used by the
SEC and state securities regulators. See Investment Advisers Act Rule 203-1, 17 C.F.R
§ 275.203-1 (1999).
7. See SEC Form ADV, 17 C.F.R. § 279.1 (1999).
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tory. The SEC reviews certain aspects of the application, and
most become effective within forty-five days.
In addition to SEC-required disclosure on Form ADV, the
Advisers Act contains a broad antifraud provision that has been
interpreted to require extensive duties of disclosure. The statute
makes it illegal to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud any client or prospective client" or "to engage in any trans-
action, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud
or deceit . . ."8 In drafting this provision, Congress was con-
cerned about the conflicts of interest inherent in the advisory
relationship, and sought to address them through disclosure.9
In the leading case interpreting this provision, the U.S. Supreme
Court wrote:
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congres-
sional recognition "of the delicate fiduciary nature of an in-
vestment advisory relationship," as well as a congressional in-
tent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest
which might incline an investment adviser-consciously or un-
consciously-to render advice which was not disinterested."°
The Supreme Court later repeated that the antifraud provi-
sions of the Advisers Act establish "federal fiduciary standards"
and "enforceable fiduciary obligations" for investment advisers."
Although the antifraud rules place certain prohibitions on advis-
ers' conduct, these prohibitions are generally addressed by dis-
closure. SEC rules, for example, prohibit cash payments for the
solicitation of advisory clients unless certain conditions are met
and the arrangements are fully disclosed.' 2 Similarly, advisers
are prohibited from selling securities to clients out of the advis-
ers' own accounts unless fully disclosed in writing beforehand
and the client consents.'"
Specific substantive rules prohibiting conduct by advisers
are few and far between. Advisers must keep certain books and
records, 14 and are generally prohibited from charging perform-
8. Investment Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-6 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
9. See S. REP. No. 1775, at 22 (1940); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 191 (1963).
10. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191-92.
11. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979).
12. Investment Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-3, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-3 (1999).
13. Investment Advisers Act § 206(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-6(3) (1997 & Supp. 1998).
14. Investment Advisers Act Rule 204-2, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (1999).
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ance fees or incentive fees-fees that are based on the perform-
ance of their investment recommendations.' 5 The SEC, how-
ever, does not require advisers to meet minimum qualifications,
satisfy substantive requirements, or be licensed by a self-regula-
tory organization, such as the National Association of Securities
Dealers (or "NASD").
Regulation of broker-dealers is a different kettle of fish.
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (or "Exchange
Act"),16 brokers are required to register with the SEC, but that's
just the beginning. The Exchange Act, and the rules under this
act, subject brokers to a panoply of substantive rules that go far
beyond disclosure. Broker-dealers are subject to licensing by the
NASD, the organization that regulates broker-dealers through its
own rules-which are approved by the SEC.1 7 Brokers also have
detailed financial responsibility requirements-like the net capi-
tal rule, which requires them to have liquid assets on hand to
meet their obligations to investors and creditors.' Brokers also
are subject to detailed credit regulations, and the Exchange Act
authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to set credit-or margin-
restrictions on the amount of money brokers can lend to cli-
ents. 19
II. WHY THE DIFFERENCE?
How do we explain the difference in the approach to the
regulation of these market participants? After all, we could im-
agine a system where we place many more substantive restric-
tions on advisers, and many countries, like France and Spain, do
place both minimum qualification and capital requirements on
investment advisers. 20 Alternatively, we could liberalize many of
15. Investment Advisers Act § 205(a) (1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-5(a) (1) (1997 & Supp.
1998).
16. Securities Exchange Act § 15, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o (1997 & Supp. 1998). Broker-
dealers register with the Commission on Form BD, which has been adopted by the SEC,
and virtually all of the states for use by these states and the self-regulatory organizations.
17. Id. § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(8) (1997 & Supp. 1998).
18. Securities Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1999).
19. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to
set rules on credit that can be maintained on non-exempt securities and makes it illegal
for any broker-dealer to extend credit in violation of the Board's rules. See Securities
Exchange Act § 7, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7 8g (1997 & Supp. 1998).
20. See MARCtIA L. MACHARG & ROBERTA R.W. KAMEDA, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF
INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION 143-44 (France), 267-68 (Spain) (1994).
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the restrictions the SEC currently places on brokers by requiring
only disclosure of balance sheet information that would reflect
the firm's net capital, but not regulate it. Why do we end up
where we are today?
There are at least two ways to explain the difference. The
first reason is historical: regulation is a response to discrete his-
torical events. 2' The second reason is functional: regulation re-
sponds flexibly to the particular function that a person or firm
performs, regardless of who is performing the function.2 2
A. A Historical Reason
In a discussion on the broad outlines of regulation, Chief
Judge Richard A. Posner remarked that we should try to under-
stand the politics of regulation-how and why did it come
about-as "crisis calls for change."2" Crisis describes the tumul-
tuous decade of the 1930s when Congress considered broker-
dealer and investment adviser legislation for the first time. A
look at the politics of regulation in the 1930s explains much of
the legislation governing brokers and subsequently advisers.
In the early part of the decade, when the Exchange Act was
enacted, the securities industry, like much of the country, was in
dire straits. The nation was calling for Wall Street to be held
accountable for the market crash, and President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the Democrats were successful in the 1932 elec-
tions by promising a New Deal for all Americans. The Securities
Act of 1933-the first federal securities law-which required
public companies to register their securities offerings and dis-
close information, was passed as part of President Roosevelt's
21. Similarly, the interest group model explains legislation as a response to inter-
est groups, or coalitions of interest groups, jockeying for support of particular legisla-
tion at a given point in time. SeeJonathan R_ Macey, Promoting Public Regarding Legisla-
tion Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 227
(1986) (stating that laws are viewed as commodities bought by particular interest
groups that outbid or outmaneuver competing interest groups).
22. A theory of functional regulation has gained currency in the debate over finan-
cial services reform. See, e.g., Melanie L. Fein, Functional Regulation: A Concept for Glass-
Steagall Reform?, 2 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 89 (1995).
23. ChiefJudge Richard A. Posner, Deregulation-Its Impact on Competition Law
in the United States, Remarks at the Weimar Symposium, The Competition Law of
Deregulation (Oct. 16, 1998). Editors Note- Also see Judge Posner's piece in this Book
of the FoRDRAm INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL.
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first hundred days in office. 24
From January 1933 until June 1934, Congress held seven-
teen months of hearings on the cause of the Great Depression.
The hearings were called the Pecora hearings, named after Fer-
dinand Pecora, counsel to the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency that conducted them. These hearings were appar-
ently followed with the same intensity as the House and Senate
Watergate Hearings and the recent impeachment proceedings
of President Clinton. During the Pecora Hearings, leading
bankers and financiers were vilified and blamed for much of the
nation's economic woes. Pecora later wrote that the public was
"deeply aroused by the spectacle of cynical disregard of fiduciary
duty on the part of many of its most respected leaders ..."'
At the same time, Congress was considering stock exchange
regulation, including the regulation of broker-dealers. Oppo-
nents of regulation blamed the Securities Act of 1933 for the
lack of financing available in 1933 and 1934, and argued that a
law regulating the stock market would make matters worse. The
argument, however, did not prevail. Although the legislative
fight was intense, Roosevelt became actively involved and, with
New Deal fervor still running strong, Congress passed the law.
The Exchange Act was considered a victory for the Roosevelt ad-
ministration by establishing the regulation of stock exchanges
and providing for the SEC as a permanent watchdog over the
markets.26
Investment adviser regulation was not enacted until six years
later. By 1939 and 1940, the first wave of reform had passed over
the country and did not include advisers. The intervening six
years were critical for shaping the legislation that would eventu-
ally be enacted.
What took Congress so long to pass adviser legislation?
First, it took time for the SEC to conduct a study and send its
report back to Congress. The genesis of the Advisers Act, and
the Investment Company Act of the same year, was a small para-
graph tucked into the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935. This provision required the Commission to study invest-
24. See, e.g., DIANA B. HENRIQUES, FIDELITY'S WORLD 79-102 (1995);JOEL SEUGMAN,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 1-72 (1995).
25. FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH 283 (1939).
26. See SELIGMAN, supra note 24, at 95-100; see also PECORA, supra note 25, at 287-91.
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ment companies and investment trusts, and report its findings to
Congress byJanuary 1937. The time it took the SEC to conduct
the study increased because of the growth of the industry, the
changing nature of services offered, and the discovery of contin-
uing abuses. The SEC did not deliver the study until 1939-two
years late.2
7
Time also was lengthened by the lobbying efforts of an in-
dustry that was slowly getting back up on its feet.28 Although the
Great Depression was still a bitter reality for most of the country,
by 1935 the stock market had started to recover, and some of the
larger advisers joined forces to form a trade association to lobby
against the impending legislation. In the summer of 1937, the
New York Herald Tribune reported "[t] hat Federal regulation is
impending is conceded on all sides, though no definite state-
ment to that effect has come from Washington. The ramifica-
tions of the 'industry' are manifold, and its problems unusually
difficult of solution." 29 Nine days later, the Investment Counsel
Association of America ("ICAA") was formed. According to the
Tribune, the certainty of legislation was a "driving force."30
The nascent ICAA had its hands full. When Senate hearings
on the investment adviser portion of the bill began in earnest in
April 1940, the ICAA and others conducted a well-orchestrated
campaign against the bill both on and off the Senate floor.a
The legislative history of the Advisers Act is filled with arguments
that the ICAA advanced against federal regulation. It argued
that advisers should be regulated by the states, not the SEC; that
the profession was not yet mature enough to be regulated; and
that fraud was present in other professions that were not subject
to federal regulation-why pick on advisers?
32
27. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 51-53 (1940) (statement of
David S. Schenker, Chief Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter
Schenker Statement].
28. HENRIQUES, supra note 24, at 83-84.
29. Luttrel Maclin, Code is Planned for Investment Counsel Trade-Impending U.S. Con-
trol Spurs Effort To Form a National Organization, N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE, July 18, 1937,
1V.8, cited in DwiGHT-r ROGERS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INVESTMENT COUNSEL ASSOCIA-
TION OF AMERICA 19-20 (1982).
30. ROGERS, supra note 29, at 19-20; Maclin, supra note 29.
31. Id. at 33-34.
32. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 745-47 (1940) (statement of
Rudolf P. Berle, General Counsel, Investment Counsel Association of America).
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The lobbying efforts of the ICAA met with success. The ini-
tial bill contained a provision, for example, that allowed the SEC
to set the terms of advisory agreements "regularly used" with cli-
ents. The industry argued that this provision was silly: there was
no such thing as a contract that was "regularly used"-and subse-
quent drafts of the bill omitted the offensive passage. 33 Provi-
sions that would allow the Commission to require advisers to file
certain reports, keep certain books and records, and open their
books to SEC examiners, did not appear until 1960, while bro-
kers have been subject to these requirements since the enact-
ment of the Exchange Act in 1934.a4
Not only were the advisers able to block provisions they dis-
liked, but they also were able to add some they wanted. The
Advisers Act included the prohibition performance fees, already
mentioned above, in part because the ICAA lobbied for it. The
ICAA was intent on protecting the reputation of its members,
and one writer at the time remarked, "[t] he objective of the asso-
ciation now being discussed is to separate the sheep from the
goats."35  Performance fees, like contingency fees for lawyers,
were viewed as inappropriate for businessmen. If advisers
wanted to keep their reputations intact, then they could not af-
ford to have the lesser members of their profession charging
performance fees.3 6
The Advisers Act, more so than the Exchange Act, was a
product of political compromise.3 7 ByJune 1940, the ICAA was
able to tell Congress that "all of [its] objections have been satis-
factorily adjusted." An ICAA representative went on: "The In-
vestment Counsel Association of America unqualifiedly endorses
the present bill ... we urgently hope passage of the bill may be
expedited at this session of Congress ...",3 The political circum-
33. Id. at 744. The language was introduced in S. 3580, but deleted in the first
reprint. A new bill, S. 4108, was introduced without the language.
34. Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3376 (3d ed. 1991); RoG-
ERS, supra note 29, at 48.
35. Maclin, supra note 29, at 78.
36. S. REp. No. 1775, at 21 (1940) (stating that not only must public be protected
from frauds and misrepresentations of unscrupulous tipsters and touts, but bona fide
investment counsel must also be safeguarded against stigma of activities of these indi-
viduals).
37. See SELIGMAN, supra note 24, at 214, 222.
38. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on H.R 10065 Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong. 92 (1940) (state-
ment of Dwight Rose, Investment Counsel Association of America).
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stances of their legislative birth, therefore, were responsible, at
least to some degree, for the difference in approach to adviser
and broker regulation.
B. A Functional Reason
The second reason for the difference in broker and adviser
regulation is functional. We learn a lot by looking carefully at
the role brokers and advisers play in the economy and the func-
tion the two pieces of legislation were designed to have-what
was Congress really trying to accomplish? The Advisers Act,
when first enacted, was primarily designed to determine the
number of advisers that were engaged in the business-it was
like a census-and then to disclose information about those ad-
visers to the public.3 9 A stated purpose of the law was to ensure
that investors had "adequate information as to the activities,
practices, ability, training, and integrity of investment advis-
ers.. ."40 Twenty years later, in the leading case interpreting the
Advisers Act, the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the
Act was "to substitute a philosophy of disclosure for the philoso-
phy of caveat emptor...
There was no attempt to try to regulate the kind of advice
advisers would provide or to standardize their qualifications. As
David Schenker, the SEC's Chief Counsel for the Investment
Trust Study, noted at the time, "I cannot impress too strongly
upon the Senators the fact that our Title II does not attempt to
say who can be an investment counselor, who can't be an invest-
ment counselor, and does not even remotely presume to under-
take to pass upon their qualifications."4 2
Another purpose of the Advisers Act was to federalize the
state law, or common law, of fiduciary duties for advisers that
had developed over time. A Declaration of Policy, in an early
draft of the legislation, stated that investors are adversely af-
fected when advisers "relieve themselves of their fiduciary obliga-
39. Schenker Statement, supra note 27, at 48, 50.
40. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 30 (1940) (Title II-Investment
Advisers, Findings of the Congress, § 202 Declaration of Policy).
41. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 198 (1963).
42. Schenker Statement, supra note 27, at 50.
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tions to their clients."4" As mentioned, the Supreme Court has
since recognized that the Advisers Act creates federal fiduciary
standards.44
The legislative history of broker-dealer legislation reflects a
different purpose. Broker-dealer legislation was not meant to
take a census of brokers, to require client disclosure, or to feder-
alize common law. Rather the legislation was meant in large
part to help restore health to the ailing economy of the 1930s. 5
The net capital rule for brokers, for example, is a liquidity rule-
customers open an account with their broker with the expecta-
tion that they will be able to liquidate their holdings even if mar-
kets fall and many investors are trying to liquidate at the same
time. As one court stated, "[t]he rule operates to assure confi-
dence and safety to the investing public."46 Advisers do not have
the same concerns. Although an adviser might advise a client to
take risks, the adviser does not have the same trading and credit
relationships with other market participants that brokers have.
As a result, advisers do not have the same sort of exposure to
market events that brokers do, and do not require the same
types of rules.
That is also true for credit regulations imposed on brokers
by the Exchange Act. Congress wrote credit regulations into the
Exchange Act explicitly not to guard the small investor against
making a bad decision to borrow and invest too much money
with his broker. Rather, Congress passed credit regulations to
ensure that credit would be directed away from stock market
speculation and toward more desirable ends.4 7
Stock exchanges at the time were accused of "sucking
funds" from every corner of the country, and speculation was
described as resulting from inadequate control of the national
credit system that made speculation of funds easy-"funds which
the national welfare much more requires in local commerce, in-
dustry, and agriculture."" The legislative history to the Ex-
43. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 30 (1940).
44. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979).
45. H.R. REP. No. 1383, at 4-6 (1934).
46. See, e.g., Blaise d'Antoni & Assoc., Inc. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir.
1961).
47. H.R. REP. No. 1383, at 8 (1934).
48. Id. at 6.
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change Act sums it up: "This legislation is not an attempt to
reach out and correct the morals of the citizens of any one State;
it is an attempt to deal with the very vital economic problems
going to the root of the functioning of our national credit sys-
tem.' '49 Unlike brokers, advisers do not generally loan money to
their clients to buy on margin, and therefore do not need the
same types of credit regulations imposed on them.
III. PERFORMANCE FEES
Whether viewed from a historical or functional perspective,
adviser regulation is primarily disclosure-based regulation-its
purpose is to provide information to the SEC and to investors,
and to promote advisers' fiduciary duties to investors. Broker-
dealer regulation is primarily substantive regulation on the activ-
ities of brokers-its purpose is to ensure macroeconomic stabil-
ity. But what about the performance fee rule imposed on invest-
ment advisers mentioned above? This restriction is substantive
and not disclosure-based. The Advisers Act provides, as it pro-
vided when enacted in 1940, that advisory contracts may not pro-
vide for compensation to the adviser "on the basis of a share of
capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the funds or any
portion of the funds of the client."5" To explain this anomaly,
we have to look at the reasons the provision was enacted, and
determine if they depart from the reasons mentioned above for
regulating advisers.
The reasons for the provision have changed over time. The
original reasons were more akin to the reasons for the prohibi-
tions on brokers than the reasons for originally adopting adviser
regulation. Recent changes to the rules the Commission
adopted under the provision, however, reflect the approach seen
for other adviser regulation.
As discussed above, the prohibition on performance fees
was enacted, in part, as a result of pressure from the ICAA. It
can also be explained through a functional approach. Con-
gress's concern with performance fees was similar to Congress's
concerns generally with broker-dealers: speculation and exces-
sive risk-taking. Congress recognized that performance fee ar-
rangements can function as an incentive for advisers to recom-
49. Id.
50. Investment Advisers Act § 205, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-5 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE U.S.
mend that clients take excessive risks, since the potential gain to
the adviser is very large, while the potential harm to the adviser
is minimal. 1 The Senate Report on the bill stated that invest-
ment advisers "can enter profit-sharing contracts which are noth-
ing more than 'heads I win, tails you lose' arrangements. "52
What could be done about these risky arrangements?
Congress was looking for ways to limit excessive speculation
in the wake of the stock market crash. Here was an area where
Congress had a ready means to adjust the incentives of advisers
to limit speculation and risk-taking, and the lawmakers seized it.
Moreover, the restriction on performance fees had the support
of the investment adviser industry, so although this rule was a
substantive restriction on the activity of advisers, it is not one
that Congress had to fight for. Thus, the performance fee rule
resulted from a mix of historical and functional influences; but
the functional influence was the attempt to limit risk-taking, the
same goal that animated the restrictions placed on brokers in
the Exchange Act. From this perspective, the performance fee
rule under the Advisers Act looks a little like broker-dealer regu-
lation in investment adviser clothing.
The performance fee rule was revised three times. In 1970,
Congress made an exception to the performance fee rule for
certain advisory contracts relating to assets of over US$1 mil-
lion."3 In 1985, the Commission adopted a rule that allowed an
adviser to charge performance fees if the adviser included cer-
tain terms in the performance fee agreement and made certain
disclosures, but only if clients had a high net worth.5 4 In 1998,
the Commission liberalized the rule even further, this time elimi-
nating all of the contractual and disclosure requirements while
increasing, to account for inflation, the amount required to
qualify as a high net worth client.
55
51. H.R. REP. No. 2639, at 29 (1940).
52. S. REP. No. 1775, at 22 (1940).
53. See Investment Advisers Act § 205(b) (2) (B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-5(b) (2) (B)
(1997 & Supp. 1998) (permitting "fulcrum" fees, which increase and decrease with in-
vestment performance, for contracts for assets over US$1 million).
54. Exemption to Allow Registered Investment Advisers to Charge Fees Based
Upon a Share of Capital Gains Upon or Capital Appreciation of a Client's Account,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 996 (1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,939, at 87,889 (Nov. 14, 1985) [hereinafter Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 996].
55. Exemption to Allow Investment Advisers to Charge Fees Based Upon a Share
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Changes to the rule over the years reflect a shift toward the
disclosure approach that has characterized other adviser regula-
tion. Congress enacted the performance fee provision in 1940
to discourage advisers from engaging in speculative trading-
not only because of the harm to investors, but also because of
the general harm to the economy. The General Statement in
the Senate Report discussing the performance fee rule points to
the increasing widespread activities of advisers and "their poten-
tial influence on security markets.. ." 6 Over the years, however,
concerns about limiting speculation that had so exercised the
Congress in the wake of the Great Depression became out-of-
date. The main concern that animated Congress and the SEC
with respect to Advisers Act rules was protection of the client
through disclosure and ensuring that advisers were meeting
their fiduciary duties. In time, these same concerns were re-
flected in changes to the performance fee provisions.
In 1970, Congress provided the exception mentioned above
for contracts over US$1 million, and more importantly, gave
the SEC broad statutory authority to grant exemptions from all
provisions of the Advisers Act.5" At the time, Congress pointed
to the performance fee rule as one of the areas where exemp-
tions would be appropriate. 59 By 1985, the SEC concluded that
it was appropriate to permit clients who were "financially exper-
ienced" and "able to bear the risks" to enter into performance
fee arrangements. 60
The notion that the protections afforded by the Advisers Act
are not necessary when the investors are wealthy makes sense in
the context of the general purpose of the Advisers Act. After all,
since wealthy investors, or their agents, have the ability to bar-
gain effectively with their adviser, they are presumably less likely
than other investors to benefit from required contractual terms
and mandatory disclosures. In the 1985 rule amendments, the
SEC required that the performance fee contract represent an
of Capital Gains Upon or Capital Appreciation of a Client's Account, Investment Advis-
ers Act Release No. 1731 [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,037, at
80,667 (July 15, 1998) [hereinafter Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1731].
56. S. REP. No. 1775, at 21 (1940).
57. Investment Advisers Act § 205(b) (2) (B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-5(b) (2) (B) (1997 &
Supp. 1998).
58. Id. § 206A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-6a (1997 & Supp. 1998).
59. S. REP. No. 91-184, at 46 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 91-1382, at 42 (1970).
60. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 996, supra note 54, 1 87,902.
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arm's length agreement. The SEC stated that, in its view, "an
arm's length arrangement between the parties is one whose
terms correspond to those which independent parties of equal
bargaining position would arrive at after negotiation and with-
out overreaching by either party."61
The Commission also reiterated the fiduciary duties of ad-
visers entering into performance fee arrangements, regardless of
the client's wealth. The Commission, in its explanation of the
rule amendments, stated that the changes "should not be read as
narrowing, in any manner, the disclosure obligations of invest-
ment advisers," and the Commission reminded advisers of their
duty of "utmost good faith and fair disclosure of all material facts
"62
In 1992, the SEC's Division of Investment Management is-
sued a report recommending that Congress pass legislation clari-
fying the SEC's authority to provide exemptions from the per-
formance fee rule for contracts with persons whom the Commis-
sion determined did not need the protections of the Advisers
Act. The SEC staff wrote that "where a client appreciates the risk
of performance fees and is in a position to protect itself from
overreaching by the adviser, the determination of whether such
fees provide value is best left to the client."6" The staff was also
concerned about the effects on competition for U.S. advisers
that were unable to enter into these contracts with international
clients "even where these arrangements are legal and customary
in a client's country of residence . . . ."" Congress listened.
Four years later, Congress amended the performance fee provi-
sion to eliminate, among other things, the restrictions with re-
gard to contracts with non-U.S. residents, and authorized the
Commission to exempt contracts with persons the SEC deter-
mines do not need the protections of the statute.6 5
In 1998, the SEC used its new authority and eliminated alto-
gether the required contractual provisions in performance fee
61. Id. 87,904.
62. Id.
63. DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF-CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION
245 (1992).
64. Id.
65. See Investment Advisers Act § 205(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-5(e) (1997 & Supp.
1998).
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contracts for sophisticated clients.66 Again, the Commission em-
phasized that "the elimination of the contractual and disclosure
provisions ... does not alter the obligation of an adviser, as a
fiduciary, to deal fairly with its clients and to make full and fair
disclosure of its compensation arrangements."67 The Commis-
sion was comfortable, at least with respect to sophisticated inves-
tors, to get out of the business of specifying certain provisions of
advisory contracts and to rely instead on the adviser's fiduciary
duties.
The amendments to the performance fee prohibition over
the past thirty years also reflect changes in the thinking of mar-
ket participants since the 1930s and 1940s. While the ICAA sup-
ported the prohibition in the 1930s, the industry supported liber-
alizing the prohibition in 1998. In the notice and comment pe-
riod for the SEC's most recent rule change, the Commission
received twenty-two comment letters. The commenters sup-
ported liberalizing the rule; many even urged the Commission to
further expand the types of clients eligible to enter into such
arrangements. 68 The ICAA, now composed of 225 of the larger
advisory firms, supported the proposal, writing that restrictions
on performance fees "have hindered flexibility" in creating per-
formance fee arrangements. "These sophisticated clients should
be able to negotiate the terms of such contracts as they see fit."69
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTMENT ADVISER AMD
BROKER REGULATION
Several recent regulatory initiatives at the SEC reflect the
two approaches to regulation-disclosure for advisers and sub-
stantive rules for brokers. The first of these initiatives is the
SEC's approach to addressing the Year 2000 (or "Y2K") com-
puter problem with respect to both advisers and brokers. The
second is the effort the Commission has taken to use disclosure
over the Internet as a regulatory tool. The third is rulemaking
the Commission has proposed to address a practice known as
66. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1731, supra note 55.
67. Id. at 80, 669-70.
68. Id. 80,669.
69. Letter from Karen L. Barr, General Counsel, ICAA, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secre-
tary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Jan. 15, 1998) (available in SEC Public File
No. S7-29-97).
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"pay to play"-where firms make political contributions to ob-
tain business with state and local governments.
A. The Year 2000 Problem
The Year 2000 problem is by now old news. The SEC, how-
ever, was reminding market participants, such as advisers and
brokers, as well as public companies, for several years to en-
courage them to take steps to avoid the Y2K computer problem.
The steps the Commission has taken to address the Y2K prob-
lem, however, differed sharply for advisers, where the emphasis
was on disclosure, and for brokers, where the SEC adopted more
substantive regulation.
For investment advisers, the SEC was concerned mainly
about whether clients were receiving sufficient disclosure of risks
associated with their advisers' Y2K preparedness. Early in 1998,
the Commission staff issued a Legal Bulletin addressing the Y2K
problem. The Legal Bulletin stated:
If the failure to address the Year 2000 issue could materially
affect the advisory services provided to clients, an adviser that
will not be able to or is uncertain about its ability to address
Year 2000 issues has an obligation to disclose such informa-
tion to its clients and prospective clients. This disclosure
must be made in a timely manner so that the clients and pro-
spective clients may take steps to protect their interests.
70
The SEC also required SEC-registered advisers to file special
reports with the Commission on a new form, Form ADV-Y2K,
about their readiness for the Y2K computer problem. 7' The
SEC, however, stopped short of placing any substantive require-
ments on advisers as to their readiness for the millennium bug.
In fact, commenters on the SEC's rule proposal requiring these
reports expressed concern that some of the questions "appeared
to prescribe steps that all advisers must take" to prepare for the
Y2K problem. In response, the SEC revised the wording of some
of the questions and stated that "the Advisers Act requires no par-
70. Division of Corporation Finance and Division of Investment Management, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Staff Legal Bulletin No. 5 (CF/IM) (Jan. 5, 1998)
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/othern/slbcf5.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
71. Investment Adviser Year 2000 Reports, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
1769 [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,049, at 80,809 (Oct. 1, 1998)
[hereinafter Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1769].
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ticular steps to be taken by an adviser" to prepare for the Y2K
problem.72 Also, in responding to questions about whether the
form placed any new substantive requirements on advisers, the
staff stated that "Form ADV-Y2K is only a report; and the only
new obligation the Commission has created on an investment
adviser is to respond to all of the questions in the form truthfully
and to file the form in a timely manner."7"
The SEC's approach to brokers' Y2K preparedness is differ-
ent, reflecting the continuing concern that brokers can affect
the securities markets in ways that advisers likely cannot-the
same difference that animated the distinctions between adviser
and broker regulation that arose in the 1930s. Brokers, like in-
vestment advisers, were required to disclose their readiness for
the Y2K problem on a form, Form BD-Y2K.7 4 The SEC recog-
nized, however, that the failure of a broker-dealer firm, due to its
function in the markets, may present systemic risks in ways that
the failure of an advisory firm does not. According to the SEC, it
is important for all broker-dealers to be Y2K compliant because
the problems of any non-compliant broker-dealer "could have
detrimental and potentially widespread consequences on other
market participants."75
The Commission, as a result, adopted what it called a
"proactive" approach that goes far beyond disclosure.76 Under
SEC rules, brokers are required to meet certain operational ca-
pability requirements. The new rules set forth specific criteria
on what it means to be Y2K ready and provide that if a broker is
not ready by August 31, 1999, or has not certified that any mate-
rial problems will be fixed by November 15, 1999, it must make
that information public and cease doing business.7 7 Thus, the
SEC responded to the Y2K problem very differently with respect
to advisers and brokers. Advisers were admonished to make ap-
72. Id. 80,812.
73. Division of Investment Management, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, FAQs About Investment Advisers and the Year 2000 Problem, Question 24 (Nov. 12,
1998) <http://www.sec.gov/rules/othern/faqs2000.htm> (on file with the Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal).
74. Securities Exchange Act Rule 17a-5(e) (5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(e) (5) (1999).
75. Year 2000 Operational Capability Requirements for Registered Broker-Dealers
and Transfer Agents, Exchange Act Release No. 41661 [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) (adopted July 27, 1999).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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propriate disclosures, while brokers may suffer the ultimate reg-
ulatory sanction: to cease doing business.
B. Use of Disclosure over the Internet as a Regulatory Tool
If disclosure is to be the primary regulatory tool governing
investment advisers, then the Internet provides a valuable new
medium to disseminate information. Securities regulators
around the world have recognized that the Internet can be a
valuable regulatory tool. In a recent report, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions wrote, "[s] ecurities reg-
ulators, like securities markets and market participants, also real-
ize the benefits of the Internet and [are] using it in innovative
ways. They are not only responding to the regulatory issues...
but also are making use of the Internet to enhance their own
regulatory effectiveness. '"78
This practice is exactly what the Commission appears to be
doing in the area of investment advisers. Although most public
issuers in the United States must file their disclosure documents
on the SEC's EDGAR system, which is made available on the
Commission's web site, investment advisers do not make their
filings on EDGAR, and until recently, their filings were obtaina-
ble only through contacting the SEC for copies. When the SEC
adopted the rule requiring Y2K disclosure forms for investment
advisers, however, it was intent on making the forms available on
the Commission's website. In the SEC's release adopting the
rule requiring the filings, the SEC stated, "[s]hortly after the
Commission receives the forms, we will make data from the
forms available on the Commission's web site."79 The Y2K forms,
both for advisers and brokers, are available on the SEC's web
site." As a result, anyone with access to the Internet can read a
simulated version of the Y2K forms filed by advisers and brokers.
This trend is likely to continue. As noted above, advisers
register with the SEC on a registration form, Form ADV, which is
mailed to the SEC and maintained in a public file. In 1996, Con-
gress required the SEC to "establish and maintain" an electronic
78. See Technical Committee, International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions, Securities Activity on the Internet, Part III (Sept. 1998) <http://www.iosco.org/docs-
public/1998-internet.security.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal).
79. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1769, supra note 71, 1 80,811.
80. The web site address is <http://www.sec.gov/news/y2k/y2kreps.htm>.
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process to respond to questions about the disciplinary history of
investment advisers,8 and permitted the SEC to require SEC-
registered advisers to file forms through any entity designated by
the SEC.8 2 The Commission is planning an electronic registra-
tion system through which advisers will satisfy both state and SEC
filing requirements by making a single electronic filing, and a
database containing information from the filings would be
placed on the Internet.83 Thus, once the electronic registration
system is complete, disclosure about investment advisers, includ-
ing their disciplinary histories, will be readily available, much
like Y2K information is available now.
C. Pay To Play
In certain circumstances, no amount of disclosure can stop
a harm from occurring. In those circumstances, even in the ad-
viser area, the SEC will likely consider substantive rules that ef-
fectively prohibit particular conduct. The most recent example
in the investment adviser area is a proposed limitation on provid-
ing advisory services when an advisory firm makes political con-
tributions to obtain government contracts-a practice known as
"pay to play."
Long before pay to play was identified as a problem in the
investment adviser area, it was considered a problem in the mu-
nicipal securities markets. 84  Broker-dealers seeking to under-
write municipal bond offerings made political contributions to
officials who could award underwriting contracts. The Commis-
sion studied the problem and determined that pay to play harms
the municipal markets: it increases the costs of underwritings,
undermines their integrity, and damages investor confidence.8 5
In 1994, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board passed Rule
81. See Investment Adviser Supervision Coordination Act § 306, Pub. L. No. 290,
110 Stat. 3416 (1996).
82. Investment Advisers Act § 203A(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 30b-3a(d).
83. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Press Release, SEC Staff Recommends
that NASDR Operate an Electronic Investment Adviser Registration System (98-120) (Oct. 30,
1998) <http://www.sec.gov/news/press/98-120.txt> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
84. See, e.g., Murky Depths (Municipal Finance), ECONOMIST, Nov. 4, 1995, at 83 (stat-
ing that minicipal bond market is "more rife with corruption than even its fiercest crit-
ics have claimed").
85. See DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION, STAFF REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKETS 9-11 (1993).
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G-37 banning the practice for broker-dealers, and the SEC ap-
proved this rule shortly thereafter.86
Rule G-37 is harsh medicine. It prohibits brokers from en-
gaging in the municipal securities business with a government
client for two years after making a political contribution to an
official of the government client who could influence the selec-
tion of the broker.8 7  The rule was challenged on free speech
grounds and upheld by a federal court of appeals as serving a
compelling government interest in preventing fraudulent and
manipulative acts.88
The SEC has now proposed for public comment a similar
antidote for investment advisers that manage public funds. In a
recent rule proposal, the SEC stated that it "received reports that
the selection of investment advisers ...may be influenced by
political contributions, and as a result, the quality of manage-
ment services provided to funds may be affected."8 9 The SEC
Chairman recently remarked, 'Just as the 'culture of pay-to-play'
came to corrupt the municipal securities market, pay-to-play has
tainted the management of public funds."9 0 The SEC cited
abuses in seventeen states and the District of Columbia, and as a
result, proposed a similar rule to G-37 for investment advisers
managing public funds.91
Why is the SEC proposing, in this instance, to regulate
86. See In the Matter of Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed
Rule Change by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Relating to Political Con-
tributions and Prohibitions on Municipal Securities Business and Notice of Filing and
Order Approving on an Accelerated Basis Amendment No. 1 Relating to the Effective
Date and Contribution Date of the Proposed Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 33,868,
59 Fed. Reg. 17,621 (Apr. 7, 1994).
87. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the Municipal Securities Rulemak-
ing Board Relating to Political Contributions and Prohibitions on Municipal Securities
Business, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-33868, File No. SR-MSRB-94-2 (Apr. 7,
1994); Self-Regulatory Organizataion and Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, 59
Fed. Reg. 17,621 (1994).
88. Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1119 (1996).
89. Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 1812 [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,512, at § I (Aug. 4, 1999)
[hereinafter Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1812].
90. Remarks by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, In the Best Interests of Beneficiaries:
Trust and Public Funds (Mar. 30, 1999) <http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/
spch263.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
91. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1812, supra note 89. SEC Investment Ad-
visers Act Rule 206(4)-5, if adopted, would prohibit an adviser from providing advisory
services for compensation for two years after the adviser (or its partners, officers, or
solicitors) made a contribution to certain elected officials or candidates.
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through a substantive ban on pay to play activities? Why not sim-
ply require disclosure of the political contributions to be consis-
tent with other regulations under the Advisers Act?
In the case of pay to play, the milder medicine of disclosure
was simply unavailable. In fact, in the SEC's release proposing
the rule, the Commission stated that it "considered proposing a
different approach" and at least tentatively rejected it.92 In the
case of pay to play, disclosure of a political contribution by the
adviser to the political official would have to be made either to
the trustee of the public pension fund, or to the beneficiaries of
the plan themselves. Disclosure to these persons, however,
would be meaningless. Disclosure to the plan trustee would
often mean disclosure to the very political officials, or their ap-
pointees, to whom the contributions were made. Disclosure to
the beneficiaries would be similarly ineffective because they
would be unable to act on the information: they are likely to be
powerless to affect hiring decisions of the adviser or to move
their pension plan to a different adviser.93
** *
The rule proposal in the pay to play area makes plain that
when disclosure would be ineffective, the SEC will consider regu-
lating investment advisers through substantive rules. But that is
likely to remain the exception rather than the rule.
Since the 1930s and 1940s, the regulation of advisers has
centered on requiring disclosure, while the regulation of bro-
kers has centered on disclosure plus placing substantive restric-
tions on their activities. Although there have been exceptions
over the years, the basic approach remains the same.
92. Id. § II.A.
93. Id.
